

# What makes Chinese open-end fund managers stay put?

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jointly

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# Introduction

- Mutual fund industry: \$7 trillion in 2000; \$65 trillion by 2021 (42% equity funds)
- Chinese market: \$3.85 trillion in 2022; \$7.5 trillion by 2025 (FT, 2018)
- Also recent key conceptual shift when distinction between the fund manager and the fund that s/he serves (e.g., Bryant, 2012; Andrew et al., 2014; Wang and Ko, 2017)
  - Initially, a typical principal-agent problem (Jensen and Smith, 1985)
  - Recently, a fundamental determinant of the asset allocation of each specific fund (e.g., Grinblatt et al., 2020)
- In contrast to most other industries, the departure of a fund manager can have a profound effect on how the fund is managed, and how its characteristics will subsequently change (Clare et al., 2014)

# What we do in this paper

We examine if, and to what extent,  
(a) the prevailing market conditions,  
(b) the manager's performance, and  
(c) the fund's characteristics  
induce a manager to leave the fund

# Theoretical Underpinnings

- Are fund managers important for the characteristics of their fund?
- Is there any impact on the fund when their manager changes?

# The importance of a fund manager for the characteristics of their fund (1/3)

- First, based on the well-established strand of literature, that examines empirically the survivability and attrition rates of funds

(e.g., Gregoriou, 2006; Getmansky, 2012)

- Factors that have been found to influence the mortality of funds include inflows, performance, liquidity constraints, asset under-management, lower skewness of returns, the alliance of firms during crises
- However, all of these factors are, to varying degrees, directly determined by their fund manager's decisions

# The importance of a fund manager for the characteristics of their fund (2/3)

- Second, based on the documenting the persistent returns that funds tend to produce and explicitly linking them to the behavior of fund managers (e.g. Stulz, 2007; Grinblatt et al., 2020)
  - Both short- and long-term persistence, indicates that fund managers trade based on specific norms and patterns of behavior; also manager types are reflected on fund strategies such as trend following and contrarian strategies
  - However, all of these norms and strategies are specific to the fund manager in charge of the fund

# The importance of a fund manager for the characteristics of their fund (3/3)

- Third, based on the literature exploring the market timing and stock picking capabilities of fund managers

(e.g. Baker, et al., 2010; Osinga et al., 2021)

- Not necessarily true for Chinese fund managers (e.g. Kosowski et al., 2006); Yi and He, 2016)
- However, abnormal (or otherwise) fund returns are directly due to fund managers' decisions

# The impact of fund manager changes

- Surprisingly, limited literature - albeit rather recent
- Fund flows increase (decrease) after a manager changes and so is fund performance primarily for recently underperforming (overperforming) funds (e.g. Khorana, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a; Dangl, et al., 2008; Kostovetsky and Warner, 2015)
- Therefore, performance (as inflows/outflows and excess returns) is directly affected by a fund manager changes




# Hypotheses Development

- H1: The probability of a fund manager leaving a fund is higher during ‘up’ markets compared to ‘down’ markets
  - Due to the much broader and well-established literature on what affects managerial job changes and careers (since Inkson, 1995)
- H2: The probability of a fund manager leaving a fund is inversely proportional to the degree of abnormal returns and/or fund flow growth that they deliver
  - Due to the embryonic literature characterised by a lack of consensus that studies the link between fund managers performance and replacement (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Bryant, 2012)
- H3: The probability of a fund manager leaving a fund is inversely proportional to the risk of the fund’s profile
  - Due to the almost non-existent literature with Clare et al. (2014) an exception

# Data

- The dataset for the funds and fund managers is drawn from the CSMAR China Funds Market Research Database
- The dataset with the factors is drawn from the China Asset Management Academy
- Our sample is for 257 fund managers that were registered for the period January 2006 and December 2017

# Data



# Methodology

- We model the duration of a fund manager's service (i.e., working in the same fund) in months as a time-to-event counting process
  - $S(t) = S(T=t) = P(T>t)$
- Non-parametric survival analysis method with time varying variates
  - The Nelson-Aalen or NA estimator of  $S(t)$
- Semi-parametric survival analysis method with time varying variates
  - The modified Cox model of Andersen and Gill (1982) for  $S(t | \text{time-varying variates})$


# Main model

$$\ln \frac{h(t | x_1, x_2, \dots)}{h_0(t)} = f(\text{$$

market conditions,  
manager's performance,  
fund risk profile  
)


# Results: non-parametric analysis

Probability of managing the same fund over time  
(Nelson-Aalen estimates)



# Results: non-parametric analysis

Probability of managing the same fund over time during an up and down market  
(Nelson-Aalen estimates)



# Results: semi-parametric analysis

<i>Panel A</i>	Coefficient Estimates				
	<i>CaPM</i>	<i>FF3</i>	<i>FF3C</i>	<i>FF5</i>	<i>FF5C</i>
<i>Lip-Market</i>	4.12***	4.23***	4.00***	4.25***	4.00***
<i>Diversity</i>	[1.41]	[1.44]	[1.39]	[1.45]	1.39
	0.32	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.34
<i>Flows</i>	0.2**	0.23**	0.23**	0.27	0.31
	[-1.59]	[-1.48]	[-1.49]	[-1.32]	[-1.16]
	0.65	0.71	0.73	0.77	0.81
<i>Alpha</i>	0.97	0.67**	0.71**	0.74*	0.67**
	[-0.03]	[-0.41]	[-0.34]	[-0.30]	[-0.39]
	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
<i>Beta MRP</i>	0.66	0.14***	0.15***	0.21***	0.18**
	[-0.42]	[-1.97]	[-1.90]	[-1.54]	[-1.71]
	0.75	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.76
<i>Beta SMB</i>	-	0.39*	0.46	0.44*	0.26**
		[-0.94]	[-0.78]	[-0.83]	[-1.36]
		0.53	0.53	0.48	0.55
<i>Beta HML</i>	-	1.03	1.11	1.17	1.27
		[0.03]	[0.10]	[0.15]	[0.24]
		0.27	0.28	0.20	0.20
<i>Beta MOM</i>	-	-	0.64	-	1.68***
			[-0.45]		[0.52]
			0.50		0.19
<i>Beta RLW</i>	-	-	-	1.36	0.85
				[0.31]	[-0.16]
				0.20	0.15
<i>Beta CMA</i>	-	-	-	0.95	0.67
				[-0.05]	[-0.40]
				0.15	0.45
<i>XP</i>	0.99	0.97	0.97	0.99	0.98
	[-0.01]	[-0.03]	[-0.03]	[-0.01]	[-0.02]
	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
<i>BMRP</i>	0.79	0.81	0.82	0.82	0.86
	[-0.24]	[-0.21]	[-0.20]	[-0.20]	[-0.15]
	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.30



# Results: non-parametric analysis

- It confirms H1 (the probability of a fund manager leaving a fund is higher during 'up' markets compared to 'down' markets)

# Results: semi-parametric analysis

- It confirms H1 (the probability of a fund manager leaving a fund is higher during 'up' markets compared to 'down' markets)
- It confirms H2 (the probability of a fund manager leaving a fund is inversely proportional to the degree of abnormal returns and/or growth of the fund flows that they deliver)
- It confirms H3 (the probability of a fund manager leaving a fund is inversely proportional to the degree of risk that they assume)

# Main findings

- Three periods: settling-in, stirring and temperate ones
- The 'up/down' markets finding implies idea that the business cycle determines the response of fund strategies (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012) is likely the result of fund manager changes
- Overperformers (due to confidence or compensation) do not seek new opportunities despite having superior information about market opportunities (Kellard et al., 2017); underperformers are not replaced by overperformers (Clare et al., 2014)
- Chinese fund managers are able to successfully appropriate the benefits from positive market movements and elude responsibility for the negative market movements

# On Endogeneity

- The explanatory variables are not stochastic (hence strongly exogenous for all the parameters)
- Even if assumed stochastic, the correlation is not contemporaneous
- There is no inherent simultaneity issue (averages vs impulses)
- Solution the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) procedure for unmeasured confounding of Martinez-Cambor et al (2019)?

Thank you for your attention!

**Questions?**