Dual Life for Equal Labour?

Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Greek Labour Market

Nick Drydakis

Department of Economics, Gallos Campus at Rethymno 74100, University of Crete, Greece

Business Economics and New Technology Laboratory *B.E.N.E.Tec*

email: ndrydakis@econ.soc.uoc.gr

Abstract

By means of a real-life experiment we investigated employment discrimination against low skilled gay men in the Greek private labour market three years after the national adoption of the European anti-discrimination employment legislation.

As it first regards occupational access, curriculum vitaes differed only in sexual orientation were faxed to advertised job openings. The estimated probability of gays to receive an interview was by 0.261 lower than that of straights. In addition, exploiting the informal wage offers on the part of tentative employers, a wage discrimination factor was found to be 0.026 for gays. As it comes, a taste and/or statistical discrimination implied against gays. Adjusted for intra-class correlation the estimated differentials were found to be statistically significant (insignificant) for the first (second) measurement. In a process to understand the nature of the discrimination we further found that persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection significantly varied; the estimated probability of males to practice occupational access discrimination against gays was by 0.350 higher than that of female. Moreover, males were found to practice insignificant wage discrimination of 0.032 against gays, while female were found to provide gays with an insignificant wage premium of 0.006 on average.

The current research contributes to the small academic literature on the economics of discrimination according to sexual orientation in Europe.

Key words: Field Experiment, Sexual Preference, Hiring Discrimination, Wage Discrimination
JEL classification: C93, J7, J16, J31, J42, J64, J71, J82

Business Economics & New TeChnologies Laboratory

1. Introduction

Despite worldwide legal protection impetus sexual orientation discrimination does exist in employment. Evidences suggest that the labour market values gay men's human capital less than that of straights. Specifically, gay men have repeatedly claimed that they are fired, not hired, or not promoted because of their orientation[1], while the estimated effects of men's "homosexuality" on earnings are found to be negative. As it comes to the latter issue, surveys from the United States[2], the United Kingdom (Arabsheibani, Mani, and Wadsworth [2004]), and the Netherlands (Plug and Berkhout [2004]) document annual earning penalties associated with same-sex sexual behavior for males, still nonetheless, the estimated penalties significantly vary amongst the surveys and conclusions challenged[3]. Yet, the systematic study of sexual orientation minorities has made it valuable for both its policy relevance and its potential to inform social scientists about the functioning of labour market.

The current research has taken account of two particular drivers. The first is that no official data and empirical studies exist to investigate gay men's employment terms in Greece. The second is the significant Eurobarometer's findings (2007/263), regarding Greeks' feeling for homosexuality. The survey reveals that the wide majority of Greeks; 0.850 feels that homosexuality is a taboo compared to 0.480 of EU, while the wide majority; 0.840 shares the opinion that it is difficult for gays and lesbians to state their sexual orientation at work, compared to 0.680 of EU. Starting from the mentioned points the scope of the present study is to unbiased investigate whether gay men are facing discriminatory practices in the Greek labour market compared to straights, and by thus to evaluate whether stereotypical misconception against gays[4] prejudice the Greek employers' screening processes, interestingly three years after the national adoption of the European anti-discrimination employment legislation (2005/3304).

In particular, by means of a Correspondence Test (CT), we first aim to detect sexual orientation discrimination at the preliminary stage of the selection process, which for gays seems to be a crucial barrier to the labour market. The reason for the latter being is that selection processes are very often

---

[1] See, Badgett, Donnelly and Kibbe (1992); Palmer (1993); Snape, Thomson and Chetwynd (1995); Mason and Palmer (1996); Colvin (2004).

[2] See, Badgett (1995); Allegretto and Arthur (2001); Berg and Lien (2001); Black, Hoda, Seth, Lower (2003); Blandford (2003), Carpenter (2005, 2007).

[3] The annual earning penalties vary between 0.030-0.300, amongst the referential studies generate insignificant and significant results. The economic explanations of the significant effects include theories of gender nonconformity (Blandford [2000]), theories of household specialization (Becker [1991]); Black, Honda, Seth, and Lower [2003]) theories of human capital endowments (Berg and Lien [2002]; Becker [1993]) and theories of discrimination (Becker [1957], Arrow [1972]).

[4] See, Hoffman (1968); Lundahl and Wadensjo (1984); Seidman (1994).

not guided by standards, whilst sometimes the standards themselves might lead to the exclusion of certain members of minority groups from obtaining a specific job (Liegl, Perching and Weyss [2004]). To be specific, a typical CT entails that the researcher sends two -equal in human capital- curriculum vitaes to each advertised job opening (Riach and Rich [2002]). However, the only characteristic that differs between the two applicants is their sexual orientations. Following Adam (1981) and Weichselbaumer (2003), openly gay worker's sexual orientation is labelled through a reference in his curriculum vitae to a voluntary work at a homosexual community. The methodology implies that the *emanated signal* is accurate for credibly testing the discrimination hypothesis[5]. Unequal treatments are then measured by the difference in the number of call backs for interview between the two groups[6]. Crucially, in the current study we do concentrate on low-skilled groups as they expected to be at more risk for discrimination: Particularly, on non-graduate workers in the private sector (Eurobarometer [2003]; [2007]). While we investigate different sectors, that is, on factors that influences variation in discriminatory behavior across vacancies.

Interestingly, in the current experiment, taking advantage of the telephone callbacks on the part of employers, as well as of the naïve portfolio of the applicants, we have extended the application of the CT technique by also gathering data concerning informal monthly wage offers on the part of employers, in the case of tentative hiring[7]. We argue that this additional data set enables us to further record discriminatory attitudes across sexual orientations in the ensuing steps of the selection process[8]. While, by extending the CT methodology we provided unbiased empirical evidence on the equivocally relationship between sexual orientation and earnings. To preview, we find that gay men face a significant probability to be invited for an interview that is by 0.261 less than that of the straights, and an insignificant wage discrimination factor of 0.026 on average. Having controlled for all human capital asymmetries amongst applicants, a taste and/or statistical discrimination imply against gays. In a process to illuminate the outcomes we further show that persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection varies: The estimated probability of males to practice occupational access discrimination against gays is by 0.350 higher than that of females. Furthermore, males are found to practice insignificant wage discrimination of 0.032 against gays, while on the other hand, females are found to provide gays with an insignificant wage premium of 0.006 on average.

---

[5] For this methodology see also, Riach and Rich (2002), and the European Handbook on Equality Data (2007).

[6] Following, Fix and Struyk (1993), the best evidence about discrimination in labour comes from real life experiments.

[7] See also Drydakis and Vlassis (2007).

[8] Following Adam Barry (1981), we assume that employers by offering an interview are indicative of their willingness to consider applicants employable.

The current study contributes to two areas that have attracted scarce research attention: the experimental investigation of employment discrimination in Greece, and investigation of discrimination by sexual orientation. Actually, to the best of our knowledge the current experiment is the first in Europe which deals with gay men labour discrimination and tests persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection impact. The experiment offers a purposive analysis of key materials and findings which may be significant in relation to public policy concerns and policy development.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we sketch out the European anti-discrimination legislation, and we briefly review the theoretical explanations of labour market discrimination. In the third section we present the model encapsulating the investigating relationships. In the fourth section we describe the methodology and the application structure of the investigation. In the fifth section we present and discuss the field results. In the sixth section we present the results of the second study examining the correlation between persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection and labour market discrimination against gays. The last section concludes.

2. Dual Life, European Legislation and Theories of Discrimination

Psychological and sociological studies suggest that gay men try to avoid discrimination by living a dual life at work (Levine and Leonard [1984]). On the labour market they pass for non gay for fear that their employment would be in jeopardy if it became known that they are gay, while outside labour market they come out[9]. Unlike ethnic and racial minorities, the disables and the elderly that are vulnerable to discrimination and harassment, gay men may be said to be in the "best position" as they can avoid discrimination by hiding their sexual orientation, regardless the drawbacks (Pharr [1988]; Byrne [1993]). However, the right to equal opportunity is an important part of the EU's approach to social integration. Union's institutions come to protect gays and lesbians so that they can undergird their identity in employment. The inclusion of Article 13 in the EC Treaty, following the entry into force of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, empowered the Union to deal with discrimination on the range of sexual orientation. That development in turn led, in 2000, to the unanimous adoption by the Council of the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78), aiming to ensure that everybody living in the EU can benefit from effective legal protection against sexual orientation discrimination. Greece, for instance,

---

[9] Following Herek (1990), homosexuality pervades societal customs like institutional racism and sexism. It operates through a dual process of invisibility and attack. It usually remains culturally invisible; when people who engage in homosexual behaviour or who are identified as homosexual become visible they are subject to attack by society.

Business Economics & New TeChnologies Laboratory

by adopting the European Legislation in January 2005 [10] (2005/3304), made sexual orientation discrimination a legally prohibited act in the labour market[11].

As regards the theoretical explanations of labour market discrimination, these are concerned with how and why productively irrelevant characteristics influence the labour market behavior of employers and workers (Swinton [1977]). There is not, however, a generally accepted theory explaining labour market discrimination, while there have been a variety of hypotheses for that. The two mainstream ones are briefly as follows. The taste hypothesis (Becker [1957]; [1971]) envisions discrimination as a preference or taste for which the discriminator is willing to pay. In particular, the taste for discrimination on the part of employers is based on the idea that they want to maintain a physical or social distance from certain groups, or they may fear that their customers or co-workers dislike transacting with minorities i.e. gays. Generally, those groups are socialized so as to perceive minorities as inferior and unreliable. However, the wage of the minority applicant would have to follow below the wage of majority applicant before the employers would be willing to overcome their dislike and hire them. As a result, the demand for minority workers is ceteris paribus lowered, depressing their relative wages, while the size of the "minority penalty" is directly related to the strength of the employers' distaste. Yet, the trouble with this postulate is that it explicitly contradicts the regular view of employers as being profit maximizers.

On the other hand, the idea that competition may eventually eliminate inefficient discrimination led to the development of the statistical discrimination hypothesis (Arrow [1972]; [1973]; Phelps [1972]; Aigner and Clain [1977]). Discrimination results from the profit maximizing response of employers to uncertainty about the quality of individual workers, while the real or subjective distributions favour the group which receives preferences i.e. straights. Statistical models of discrimination predict that if employers perceive minorities as being generally less productive than majorities, and if it is difficult to measure the actual workers' productivity, then minorities with above-

---

[10]In particular, the #2005/3004 applies to a range of grounds, including racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation (regarding both the public and private sectors), in relation to: (a) Conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupation, selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever is the branch of activity and the level of the professional hierarchy (including promotion). (b) Access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience. (c) Employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay, (d) Membership of and involvement in an organization of workers or employers, or any organization whose members carry on a particular profession, including the benefits provided for by such organizations, (e) Social protection, including social security and health care, (f) Social advantages, (g) Education, (h) Access to the supply of goods and services which are available to the public (including housing).

[11] Instructive, civil marriage between same sex people does not exist in Greece.

Business Economics & New TeChnologies Laboratory

average productivity may receive below-average returns. If this is the case, a price markup and/or exclusionary tactics are asked so as to compensate for lower expected profit and/or higher risk.

However, any or a combination, of the above explanations can be validated by the CT results that follow. Any theory of the cause of discrimination make predictions about the circumstances under discrimination will occur, and CT's data make it possible to determine which predictions are supported by employers' behaviour [12]. More importantly, those results can significantly contribute to our perception about what may amongst else affect the opportunities of certain minority groups to access occupations and thus uncover well concealed discrimination which is hard to detect by other means. At the same time, the potential of directly collecting discrimination data may further support anti-discrimination policies, since these policies can only be as good as the information on which they are based[13].

3. The Model

The above practices imply that discrimination in the Greek labour market may take various forms and be related with the candidate employees' -other than productivity- characteristics. Stemming from that, in this paper we particularly examine whether *sexual orientation* affects: First, the probability (P_{CB}) of an applicant to receive a call-back for a job interview. Second, the monthly wage offer (W_{CB}) on the part of the applicant's (tentative) employer. We respectively specify the following estimable relationships.

$$P_{CB}(callback=1) = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \text{ sexual orientation} + u_1 \qquad (1)$$
$$W_{CB} = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 \text{ sexual orientation} + u_2 \qquad (2)$$

By construction of this *CT* (see, amongst else, Neumark, Bank and Van Nort [1996]; Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]), all applicants have to be matched in all characteristics (e.g. age, human capital, marital status, masculinity etc) other than *sexual orientation*; *sexual orientation* takes the value of 1 (0) if the candidate is straight (gay) and its impact is measured by the b_1, and b_2 coefficients. Moreover, having controlled for same but *sexual orientation* characteristics across the two applicants,

---

[12] Taste and/or statistical hypothesis of discrimination against gay men can be crystallized in the terms: Homophobia, Heterosexism and Sexual Prejudice. Following, Weinberg (1972) homophobia is used to label heterosexuals' dread of being in close quarters with homosexuals as well as homosexuals' self loathing. In general, distastes and phobia focus on homosexual peoples' behaviour, lifestyle and culture. Heterosexism is used as a term analogous to sexism and racism, describing an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community (Herek [1990]). The term highlights the parallels between antigay sentiment and other forms of prejudice, such as racism, anti-Semitism, and sexism. While, sexual prejudice refers to all negative attitudes based on sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual. The prejudice is almost always directed at people who engage in homosexual behaviour or label themselves gay, lesbian, or bisexual (Herek [2000]).
[13] See European Handbook on Equality Data (2006).

Business Economics & New TeChnologies Laboratory

the latter is not expected to be correlated with the error term in each equation. As in particular regards the second relationship; wage offers are of course observed only if an applicant receives a call-back. Still, nonetheless, there has been no form of omitted variables which may have bias those offers; the same independent variable, i.e. *sexual orientation*, presumably influences call-backs as well as informal wage offers. Hence, as well no correlation should be expected amongst error terms across the two equations (see, e.g., Green [2003]; Sartori [2003]; Heckman [1990])[14].

What does really matter in the field experiment, nonetheless, is the intra-class correlation among the dependent variables (see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]). Regarding the first relationship, two curriculum vitaes were sent to the same firm; hence the probability of the straight (gay) applicant to receive a call-back is rather correlated with the probability of the gay (straight) applicant to receive one. Similarly, in the second relationship, firms' wage offers to the straight (gay) applicant are expected to be correlated with their offers to the gay (straight) applicant. Thus, in order to correctly analyze the data those correlations are needed to be taken into account. If not, the standard errors would be underestimated, rendering invalidity to our significance tests[15]. In the estimations that follow full information-adjusted standard errors are therefore reported[16].

4. Methodology and Application Structure

Descending the seminal paper of Riach and Rich (2002) different forms of field experiments have been used to test for discrimination in hiring[17] . Due to their controllability and the unequivocal measurement which they entail[18] these real-life experiments have become quite popular and they have been carried out in at least fifteen countries/states[19].

---

[14] Note, that Heckman selection models (ML, Two Steps) are not appropriate, as both equations include only the same independent variable: *sexual orientation.*

[15] The intra-class correlation is a measure of variation between and within clusters of individuals (see, e.g., Fleiss, Levin and Paik [2003]). Specifically, the within-cluster correlation will affect the power of a trial, because a greater homogeneity of cluster members will increase the standard error of the estimate of the treatment effect. This results into a loss of power to detect a difference between the intervention and control groups.

[16] See, Stata Library: Analyzing Correlated Clustered Data.

[17] There are two other procedures that had been previously used to measure discrimination in the labour market. These methods involve personal approaches, in which individuals either apply over telephone (Brown and Gay [1985]; Hubbuck and Carter [1980]) or they attend job interviews (Daniel [1968]; McIntosh and Smith [1974]).

[18] CT can only be effective in demonstrating discrimination at the initial stage of a selection process, as well as in measuring the results of the selection process (see Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]). However, in our context, one cares about whether a candidate will eventually get a job, as well as about the wage offered conditional on getting the job. Whilst, in real life, job and wage offerings are also obtained via informal search and networks (see Allosino, Reyneri, Venturini and Zincone [2004]; Olli Segendorf and Rooth [2006]).

[19] In Europe such experiments have been carried out in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Denmark, England, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands; as well as in Australia and the U.S.

Our experiment was conducted between December 2006 to September 2007 and involved the capital of Greece, Athens. In order to measure occupational access discrimination for gays, we had fabricated two imaginary, equal in human-capital workers/testers, applying to the same job by sending curriculum vitaes using different fax devices. The occupations, to which we have been focused on, covered a large spectrum of job quality: office jobs, industry jobs, café and restaurant services and shop sales. These occupations have been chosen because, while there as well have been many low skilled vacancies in agriculture, construction, cleaning, and delivery, in most of the latter cases only telephone contact was available. Interestingly, however, the investigated occupations allowed for further classification in accordance to the nature of the research. It is rather obvious that a key issue that arise when low skilled gay applicants seek for a job is the visibility and invisibility of equality, tolerance and diversity in relation to their sexual orientation in sectors. Though industry vacancies as the masculine jobs, café-restaurant services and sales vacancies as the gay friendly jobs while office vacancies as the most status jobs, regarding the sample, we had a further dimension to take into account[20].

Next, we applied to vacancies where there was demand for eight-hour and five-day employment. These vacancies were identified through a random sample of advertisements, appearing in website newspapers, and as we have already mentioned we concentrated on low-skilled groups as they expected to be at more risk for discrimination. The curriculum vitaes were faxed simultaneously, within one day of the advertisement appearance, and if firms were interested about any of the applicants they could be reached either through an available postal address[21], or by telephone contact. The qualifications and the presentation style of our two fictitious applicants were matched as closely as possible, so that they were identical in all employment relevant characteristics but sexual orientation. While, each application was designed so as to equally convey the type of experience that might make an applicant attractive. Each of our fictitious applicants/testers was allocated a male Greek distinctive first and last name, a mobile telephone number, and a postal address. The addresses were chosen so that to be recognized as similar as possible, in order to indicate the same social class. Applications showed the same level of schooling and job experience. Both candidates had finished high schools, approximately twelve years ago (Appendix 1). Furthermore, the applicants were 29 years old, unmarried, and had carried out military service in different areas[22]. Both candidates had nine years of

---

[20] See, Colgan, Greegan, McKearney and Wright (2006).

[21] However, no firm responded in a written way.

[22] In Greece, having carried out the military service typically boosts a male's probability of being hired. Thus, in order our two candidates to be as equal as it is possible, we had to consider this crucial factor too.

work experience in a similar post to each vacancy applying for, while, to avoid detection, the candidates' high schools and previous workplaces were located at different areas in Athens. Moreover, both applicants had similar hobbies and personal characteristics entailed similar masculinity[23].

However, the two applicants were identical apart from their sexual orientation. The gay's application was denoted by a reference in the personal information part, of the line "member volunteer in the Athenian Homosexual Community". To control the probability that the activity may create holdbacks in his present duties it had ended. Also, in case that "activism" might bias the selection process, the straight's curriculum vitae mentioned a past volunteerism in an environmental community too. For obvious reasons, the styles of the curriculum vitaes and cover letters were different for each pair. Yet, in order to control for the possibility the style of an application to influence an employer's response, those two -different in style- application forms were equally allocated between the straight and gay applicants. For the same reason, applications were sent alternately to each vacancy; in half cases the straight (the gay) application was first sent. Both experimental controls adjusted in the regression stage[24].

Following, whenever firms called for arranging appointments with the applicants the two testers were trying to raise informal questions, concerning monthly wage offers. To verify that the testers were identical to all "observed", in the telephone contact, characteristics e.g. accent[25], masculinity, articulation, age and mansuetude, and that they were also responding equally, either to employers' clarifications or to their own questions, we had conducted pre-tests: Having recorded a testers' pilot rehearsal, considerable numbers of individuals were asked to confirm the relevant issues. Our true experiment then began only after a unanimous advocacy had been reached. On the other hand, however, we must note that it is off course impossible to test a firm's truthfulness, until a candidate is actually hired.

5. Field Results

Having completed field-data collection[26] we subsequently evaluated the effects of *sexual orientation* by estimating equations (1) and (2), using the entire data set, as well as separately for each

---

[23] Gay men who violate genders rules face considerable prejudice as their mannerism is inconsistent with society's expectations about masculinity (Levine [1998]; Herek [2004]).

[24] For an extensive study on control variables and random events see Fix and Struyk (1993).

[25] Both testers have been chosen to have a masculine accent entailed similar gender. The researcher is quite concerned that the level of wage discrimination might be greater against the gay applicant with womanish accent.

[26] Descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix 2.1.

one of our four reference occupations. The coefficient estimations, effectively regarding gay-straight paired differences, are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below.

Table 1 Probit : Marginal Effects; Independent Variable : *Sexual Orientation*

Occupations	Office Jobs	Industries	Restaurant and Café Services	Shop Sales	Total
Coefficient					
β_1	-0.304	-0.248	-0.211	-0.289	-0.261
s.e.	(0.295)	(0.252)	(0.203)	(0.150)	(0.207)
p-values	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*
Observations	-910-	-692-	-1022-	-804-	-3428-

Notes: Standard errors (s.e) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*); 5 %(**).

Table 1, shows that the gay labelled applicants face a marginal probability to be invited for an interview that is by 0.261 less than that of the straights on average. Though, heterogeneity amongst sectors, the probability varies across them: In office jobs gay men face 0.304 less probability to be invited for interview, followed by 0.289 in shop sales, 0.248 in industries, and 0.211 in restaurants and café services. The findings provide significant evidence that, of the two identical applicants engaging in an identical job search, the gay would receive fewer interview callbacks. It implied that gay men relative to straights have to spend more time, effort, and resources, for an interview, as the same observable signal is more precise for straights than gays. Therefore, on the part of employers taste and/or statistical discrimination is implied against gays.

Mentionable, although applicants by construction appeared to be similar, they do look different to employers. The findings reveal differences among the two counter pairs, across sectors, while at the same time suggest that, no matter the status of the vacancies, discrimination is well founded, with the straight applicants always having advantages: In all low-skill occupations the gay applicant is found to face significant constraints in the selection process. Nonetheless, naturally considering office jobs being a higher-status sector, the findings reveal that in these vacancies gay applicants face the higher occupational access constraints. Interestingly and parallel to the above analysis, gay applicants do not seem to enjoy a significant access premium in the gay-friendly occupations. Regardless norm ordains; "unskilled young gays to be dovetailed and segregated in sales and café-restaurant services", the estimations can not countersign the fact. Actually, in industries the gay applicants face a less discrimination factor than that in shop sales.

Moreover, we have re-estimated equation (1) including (adjusted) two binary controls variables: Curriculum vitaes' sending order and type style, still nonetheless their impact on the relevant outcome is negligible (see, Appendix 3, Table 3.1). The coefficients estimations indicate statistically significant less probability for the gay labelled applicant to be invited for interview of about 0.211-0.303,

amongst the four sectors. Since experimental conditions are equally assigned, these controls do not substantially affect the estimated effect of sexual orientation, but they make the estimate more precise.

Turning next to equation (2), Table 2, the estimations entail that the gay labelled applicants face a monthly "sexual orientation penalty" of 18.33€, producing a wage discrimination factor[27] d=0.026, which is a statistically insignificant outcome on average. Separately in each sector we found similarly insignificant small effects. The higher penalty is found in shop sales (14.97€ [d=0.023]), followed by office jobs (8.77€[d=0.011]), restaurant and café services (6.07€[d=0.009]), and industries (2.91€[d=0.003]).

Table 2: OLS : Coefficient Estimations & Marginal Effects; Independent Variable : *Sexual Orientation*

Occupations	Office Jobs	Industries	Restaurant and Café Services	Shop Sales	Total
Coefficient					
β_2	-8.770 me -0.011	-2.916 me -0.003	-6.078 me -0.009	-14.976 me -0.023	-18.330 me -0.026
s.e	(19.774)	(16.487)	(13.478)	(11.609)	(10.409)
p-values	0.663	0.862	0.657	0.212	0.120
Observations	-125-	-90-	-106-	-155-	-476-

Notes: Standard errors (s.e) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*); 5 %(**).

In all sectors the wage differentials of this magnitude represents an insignificant loss in gay's welfare. As it comes, the lower relative to straights, accessibility of gays to the reference occupations entails discriminatory but statistically insignificant effects in the ensuing steps of the selection process. Although, the implied penalty required for adequate compensation it is not high enough as to arouse the suspicion of the prospective seekers, it seems that employers may consider gays as being less productive than straights, hence, the former would have to suffer the monthly sexual orientation penalty, whenever employed; and/or employers might be willing to overcome a taste against gays if their wages fall bellow those of straights. Interestingly, the estimations indicate that in industries the discrimination factor get its lower value, compared to others. Partially, it implied that masculinity does not fight it out gays' welfare. However, someone could further claim that in industries as well as in office jobs wages are rather fixed, mainly on payroll criteria, and thus they can not be extensively fluctuated depending on irrelevant to human capital endowments[28].

For a deeper investigation, we have re-estimated equation (2) limited the sample only to those cases where both applicants/testers received a wage offer (Appendix 3, Table 3.2, Panel A). The coefficients estimations indicate a less insignificant income disadvantage of about; 0.008-0.019,

---

[27] This factor d typically measures the strength of the firms' bias regarding –informal- wage offers, i.e., the % by which the wage of the gay applicant would have to fall below the wage of the straight before firms are prepared to consider both as equally employable. So, d corresponds to marginal effect.

[28] See, Colgan, Greegan, McKearney and Wright (2006).

Business Economics & New TeChnologies Laboratory

generating a wage discrimination factor of 0.015, against gays on average. Similarly, in shop sales the wage discrimination factor gets the higher value while in office jobs it gets the lower value. Furthermore, including to the latter regression a binary variable: Firms' callbacks order, its impact is found to be negligible (Appendix 3, Table 3.2, Panel B). Thus, whether firms had contacted the straight (gay) applicant first (second) it is rather oblivious to the wages offers.

6. Discussion: Sex and Discrimination

Having estimated a significant degree of occupational access discrimination against gays we were interested also in investigating whether persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection could determine discriminatory attitudes. Following, Kimmel (1994) and Kimmel and Mahler (2003), sexual orientation discrimination is not evenly distributed throughout society, but is more or less pronounced according to demographic characteristics. An sizeable amount of empirical surveys show individuals' attitudes toward gay men to be consistently correlated with sex (Yang [1997]; Davis, Yarber, Bauserman, Schreer and Davis [1998]).

To attempt to assess the role of these, in the current experiment whenever firms had call backed applicants in order to arrange an appointment the testers gathered specifically information concerning interlocutors' status. The methodology enabled: To effectively identify those persons i.e., employers and managers, who were responsible for the applicants' selection, and effectively to register their sex. Persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection impact on gay's[29] terms of employment is summarized in Table 3 and 4, below.

Table 3: Probit: Marginal Effects; Independent Variable: *Persons' Sex Responsible for Applicants' Selection*

Occupations	Office Jobs	Industries	Restaurant and Café Services	Shop Sales	Total
Coefficient					
β_{So}	-0.356	-0.290	-0.289	-0.393	-0.350
s.e.	(0.104)	(0.222)	(0.175)	(0.087)	(0.061)
p-values	0.000*	0.195	0.108	0.000*	0.000*
Observations	-187-	-131-	-169-	-209-	-696-

Notes: The dependent binary variable is total invitations-discriminations for the gay applicant. Sex impact is measured by the coefficients β_{So}. Standard errors (s.e) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*), 5 %(**).
.

Table 3, reveals significant results that can not be underestimated. On average, gays' occupational access significantly varies depending on persons' sex responsible for applicants'

---

[29] Notice that discriminatory treatments against the straight applicants are generally attributed to random events. Following, Wienk, Clifford, Simonson and Eggers (1979) the share of calls in which a minority applicant is favored provides an estimate of the extent to which random factors are at work. In our case the occupational access discrimination against the straight applicant was a negligibly outcome; 0.005, which made unable to test for any correlation between persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection and the relevant discrimination (see, Myers [1990]).

selection. The estimated probability of males to discriminate against gays is by 0.350 higher than that of females on average[30]. Analytically, in shop sales the estimated probability of males to discriminate against gays is by 0.393 higher than that of females, while in office jobs is also higher by 0.356. In industries and café-restaurant vacancies, however, persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection insignificantly stands[31]. Moreover, as Table 4 shows, males practice insignificant sexual orientations penalties of 22.13€[0.032] against gay labelled applicants, Panel A, while females provide them with an insignificant wage premium of 4.52€[0.006], Panel B, on average.

Table 4 OLS : Coefficient Estimations & Marginal Effects; Independent Variable: *Persons' Sex Responsible for Applicants' Selection*

Occupations	Office Jobs	Industries	Restaurant and Café Services	Shop Sales	Total
Coefficient					
Panel A: male					
β_{Spm}	-13.570 me -0.018	-2.947 me -0.004	-3.411 me -0.005	-21.087 me -0.003	-22.139 me -0.032
s.e.	(23.638)	(12.238)	(13.380)	(10.855)	(11.071)
p-values	0.574	0.813	0.802	0.067	0.056
Observations	-100-	-83-	-98-	-122-	-403-
Panel B: female					
β_{Spf}	5.147 me 0.006	-14.000 me -0.021	-28.333 me -0.044	7.652 me 0.011	4.527 me 0.006
s.e.	(21.781)	(61.442)	(64.652)	(16.686)	(18.503)
p-values	0.818	0.813	0.679	0.657	0.810
Observations	-25-	-7-	-8-	-33-	-73-

Notes: In Panel A, the dependent variable is males' wage offers. In Panel B, the dependent variable is females' wage offers. Sex impact is measured by the coefficients β_{Spm} and β_{Spf}. Standard errors (s.e) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*), 5 %(**).
.

In particular, if the persons responsible for applicants' selection are males; a sexual orientation penalty against gays exists of 21.08€[0.033] in shop sales, followed by 13.57€[0.018] in office jobs, by 3.41€[0.005] in restaurant-café services and by 2.94€[0.004] in industries. On the other hand, if persons responsible for applicants' selection are females; an insignificant wage premium for gays is identified in shop sales of 7.65€[0.011] and in offices of 5.14€[0.006]. However, in restaurant-café services a sexual orientation penalty for gays implied which is higher by 28.33€[0.044], followed by 14.00€[0.021] in industries[32].

---

[30] Notice, that in those cases where the gay applicant was invited for interview, persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection was assigned by the relevant tester. Meanwhile, in those cases where the gay was discriminated, persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection was effectively assigned by the straight tester.

[31] In these vacancies the representation of female employers was scarce restricted volatility.

[32] Furthermore, we have re-estimated the relation limited the sample only to those cases where both applicants/testers received a wage offer (see, Appendix 3, Table 3.2, Panel A&B). On average, as Panel A and B show, male and female persons responsible for applicants' selection practice insignificant sexual orientations penalties against gays of 13.97€ [0.021], and of 2.27€[0.003], respectively. As it comes, if persons responsible for applicants selection are males, the sexual orientation penalty against gays is of 14.21€[0.021] in restaurant-café services, followed by 14.05€[0.003] in shop sales, by 10.62 €[0.015] in industries, and by 10.00€[0.013] in offices (Panel A). Consequently, the estimations indicate a less insignificant income disadvantage. On the other hand, if persons responsible for applicants selection are females, the sexual orientation penalty against gays is of 15.00€[0.024] in restaurant-café services, followed by 5.00€[0.007] in shop sales, while in industries and in offices no penalty exists (Panel B).

Utilized persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection, there are some patterns in the results which provide some interesting insights. It seems that males are more reluctant in their reactions to homosexuality as they are significantly more prone to practice higher occupational access discrimination than females (see, Kitien and Whitley [1998]). Yet, following Herek (1986), males' relationship between homophobia and masculinity is evident in the first place in their relatively stronger allegiance to homophobic attitudes. Indeed, males include stronger beliefs than females about genders, morality, and danger by which men homosexuality is defined as "inferior" which predetermine their attitudes (see e.g., Davis, Yarber, Bauserman, Schreer and Davis [1998]). Actually, the estimations indicate that males do inflict higher sexual orientation penalties to overcome their dislikes and/or uncertainty for gay labelled applicants.

However, we must keep in mind that a complete understanding of gay men discrimination requires analysis of its roots in culture and social interactions, as well as individual thought processes. Definitely, people's attitudes are formed on the basis of personal experiences, beliefs norms and standards as well as on actual contextual events[33] (Herek [1992], [2004]; Pharr [1998]).

7. Conclusions

In 2000 the European Union had instituted specific legislation aiming to lay down a framework for combating discrimination in the labour market. Briefly, that legislation made clear that people affected by discrimination should have adequate means of legal protection against unequal treatments, and an effective right of redress. It proves, however, that a history of discrimination cannot turn overnight. This study is the first in Greece using a Correspondence Test to examine whether sexual orientation discrimination against gay men exists in the Greek labour market.

Focus on the selection process our results reveal significant sexual orientation differences in access to occupations, and insignificant in wage offers. Gay men relative to straights have to spend more effort, and resources, for an interview, as the same observable signal is more precise for straights than gays. In particular, the estimated probability of gays to receive an interview invitation is found to be by 0.261 lower than that of the straights, while the wage discrimination factor is estimated to be 0.026 for gays. The estimations suggest that it is required a willingness to spend amounts of time job-

---

[33] Although CT can not measure other than occupational access and wage discrimination against gay applicants; during the experiment we became ourselves victims of abuses and bulling. After a short period of CVs sending the gay applicant's-tester's mobile started to receive intimidating calls (from males) and sms regarding his sexual orientation, which lasted up to the end of the experiment. Although we can not identified whether the calls came from employers, managers or other employees, or whether the gay labelled applicant have been rejected or called for interview, the experience came to illuminate some further discriminatory incidents which might face an openly gay in the workplace.

hunting if men are openly gay, while the wage differentials of this magnitude would represent an insignificant loss in gay's welfare. Last but not least, in a process to illuminate the outcomes, we further find that persons' sex responsible for applicants' selection significantly varies; the estimated probability of males to practice occupational access discrimination against gays is by 0.350 higher than that of female. Furthermore, males are found to practice insignificant wage discrimination of 0.032 against gays, while female are found to provide gays with an insignificant wage premium of 0.006 on average.

Reference

Adam, B. (1981): "Stigma and Employability: Discrimination by Sex and Sexual Orientation in the Ontario Legal Profession", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 216-222.

Aigner, D. and Cain, C., (1977): "Statistical Theories of Discrimination", in *Discrimination in the Labor Markets*, edited by O. Ashenfelter O. and Rees A., Princeton University Press.

Allegretto, S., Arthur, M., (2001): "An Empirical Analysis of Homosexual/Heterosexual Male Earnings Differentials: Unmarried and Unequal?", *Industrial and Labour Relation Reviews,* 54(3), 631-646.

Arabsheibani, G.R., Marin A., and Wadsworth J., (2004): "Gays' Pay in the UK", *Economica*, 72(286): 333-347.

Arrow, K. J.,(1973): "The Theory of Discrimination", in *Discrimination in Labour Markets*, edited by Ashenfelter O. and Rees A., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3-33.

Badgett, M. V. L. (1995): "The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination", *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 726-739.

Badgett, M. V. L., Donnelly, C., Kibbe, J. (1992): "Pervasive Patterns of Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men: Evidence from Surveys Across the United States", National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

Baran, P. and Sweezy, P., (1966): *Monopoly Capital*, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Becker, G.S., (1957): *The Economics of Discrimination*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Becker, G.S., (1991): *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Becker, G.S., (1993): *Human Capital*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Berg, N. and Donald, L. (2001): "Measuring the Effect of Sexual Orientation on Income: Evidence of Discrimination", *Contemporary Economic Policy*, Vol. 20, No 4, pp. 394-414.

Black, D. A., Hoda, R. M. Seth, S. and Lower T. (2003): "The Earnings Effects of Sexual Orientation", *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 449-469.

Blandford, J. M. (2003): "The Nexus of Sexual Orientation and Gender in the Determination of Earnings", *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 622-642.

Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2004): "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? Field Experiment on Labour Discrimination", *American Economic Review*, pp 991-1014.

Bozani, V., (2003): "Women Participation in the U.S. Labour Market for 1975", Essay for the Department Seminar Applied Economics, Department of Economics, University of Crete.

Byrne, J. (1993): "Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity", *Yale Law and Policy Review*, No 11, pp 47-56.

Cartney, M. D. (2004): "Population Effects on Gay and Lesbian Earnings", University of California, Irvine.

Carpenter, C. S. (2007): "Revisiting the Income Penalty for Behaviorally Gay Men: Evidence from NHANES III", *Labour Economics*, No 14, pp 25-34.

Carpenter, C.S. (2005): "Self-Reported Sexual Orientation and Earnings: Evidence from California", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp 258-273.

Colgan, F., Creegan, C., McKearney, A., and Wright, T., (2006): "Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Workers: Equality, Diversity and Inclusion in the Workplace", A Qualitative Research Study", Comparative Organization and Equality Research Centre, London, Metropolitan University.

Colvin, A. R. (2004): "The Extent of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Topeka, KS", National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute.

Davis, C.M., Yarber, W.L., Bauserman, R., Schreer, G., and Davis, S.L. (1998): *Handook of Sexuality – Related Measures*, (Eds), Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage.

Drydakis, N. and Vlassis, M. (2007): "Ethnic Discrimination in the Greek Labour Market: Occupational Access, Insurance Coverage and Wage Offers", Department of Economics, University of Crete, Working Papers Series 17 *(Revised Version)*.

Fix, M. and Struyk R. (1993), Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America, The Urban Institute Press: Washington, D.C.

Heckman, J. (1990): "Varieties of Selection Bias", American Economic Review, 80, 313-318.

Herek, G. M. (2000): "The Psychology of Sexual Prejudice", *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9*, 19-22.

Herek, G. M., and Capitanio, J.P. (1999): "Sex Differences in How Heterosexuals Thinks about Lesbians and Gay Men: Evidence from Survey Context Effects", *Journal of Sex Research*.

Herek, G. (Ed.). (1998): *Stigma and sexual orientation: Understanding Prejudice Against Lesbians, Gay Men and Bisexuals*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Herek, G.M. (1997): Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay men: Does Coming Out Make a Difference? In M. Duberman (Ed.), *A Queer World: The Center for Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader*, New York: New York University Press.

Herek, G.M. and Capitanio, J.P. (1996): "Some of My Best Friends: Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22*(4), 412-424.

Herek G. M., (1994): "Assessing Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men: A Review of Empirical Research with the ATLG Scale", in Greene, B., and Herek, G.M., (Eds.), *Lesbians and Gay Psychology*, Thousands Oaks, CA, Sage.

Herek G. M., (1992): "Psychological Heterosexism and Anti-Gay Violence: The Social Psychology of Bigotry and Bashings", in Herk G. M., and Berrill K.T., (Eds.), *Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men*, Thousands Oaks, CA, Sage

Herek, G. M. (1990): "The Context of Anti-Gay Violence: Notes on Cultural and Psychological Heterosexism", *Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 5*, 316-333.

Herek, G. M. (1986): "On Heterosexual Masculinity", *American Behavioural Scientist*, 27, pp 545-562.

Hoffman, M. (1968): The Gay World, New York: Basic Book.

Kendall, C., N. (1996): "Homophobia as an Issue of Sex Discrimination: Lesbian and Gay Equality and the Systematic Effect of Forced Invisibility", *Murdoch University School of Law*, Volume 3, Number 3.

Kimmel, M. (1994): Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, In H. Brod & M. Kaufman (Eds.), *Theorizing Masculinities* (pp. 119-141). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Kimmel M.S. and Mahler M. (2003): "Adolescent Masculinity, Homophobia, and Violence: Random School Shootings, 1982-2001", State University of New York at Stony Brook, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 46 No. 10, June 2003 pp. 1439-1458.

Business Economics
& New TeChnologies Laboratory

Kitie, M. E. , and Whitley, B. E., Jr. (1998): "Do Heterosexual Women and Men Differ in their Attitudes Toward Homosexuals? A Conceptual and Methodological Analysis", in Herek G. M. (ed): *Stigma and Sexual Orientation: Understanding Prejudice Against Lesbians, Gay Men and Bisexua*l, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Klawitter, M. and Victor, F. (1998): "The Effects of State and Local Antidiscrimination Policies on Earnings for Gays and Lesbians", *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 658-86.

Levine, M. and Leonard, R. (1984): "Discrimination against Lesbians in the Work Force", *Signs*, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 700-710.

Lundahl, M. and Wadensjo E. (1984): Unequal Treatment. New York: New York University Press/Croon Helm.

Macpherson, D., McConnell, and Brue, S., (2006): *Contemporary Labour Economics*, McGraw – Hill.

Mason, A., and Palmer A. (1996): Queer Bashing: A National Survey of Hate Crimes Against Lesbians and Gay Men: London, Stonewall.

Makkonen T. (2007): "European Handbook on Equality Data"*, European Commission,* Finnish Ministry of Labour.

Montgomery, D.C. and G.C. Rumer (1994), *Applied Statistics and Probability for Engineers*, John Wiley and Sons.

Myers, R.H. (1990): *Classical and Modern Regression with Applications*, Boston: Duxbury Press, 1990.

Neumark, D., Bank, R.J., and Van Nort, K. D., (1996): "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 915 – 941.

Palmer, A. (1993): "Less Equal than Others: a Survey of Lesbians and Gay Men at Work", London: Stonewall.

Pharr, S. (1988): "Homophobia: A Weapon of Sexism", Little Rock: Chardon Press.

Phelps, E. S., (1972): "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism", *American Economic Review*, 659-661.

Plug, E., Berkhout, P., (2004): "Effects of Sexual Preferences on Earnings in the Netherlands", *Journal of Population Economics*, 17(1), 117-131.

Sartori, A. (2003): "An Estimator for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Model Without Exclusion Restrictions", Political Analysis 11:111-18.

Riach, P. A. and Rich, J., (2002): "Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place", *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 112, F480-F518.

Seidman, S. (1994): "Queer-Ing Sociology, Sociologizing Queer Theory: An Introduction", *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 166-177.

Snape, D., Thomson, K. and Chetwynd, M. (1995): "Discrimination Against Gay Men and Lesbians: a Study of the Nature and Extent of Discrimination in Britain Today", London: SCPR.

Special Eurobarometer (2007): "Discrimination in the European Union", 263, Wave 65.4.

Swinton, D.H.A., (1977): "Labor Force Competition Theory of Discrimination in the Labor Market", *American Economic Review*: Paper and Proceedings 67:400-404.

Weichselbaumer, D. (2003): "Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Hiring", *Labour Economics*, Vol. 10, pp. 629-642.

Weinberg (1972), Society and the Healthy Homosexual*,* New York: St. Martin's.

Wienk, R., Reid, C., Simonson, J. and Eggers, F. (1979). *Measuring Racial Discrimination in American Housing Markets: The Housing Market Practices Survey*, Office of Policy Development and Research, Washington DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Yang, A.S., (1997): "Trends Attitudes Toward Homosexuality", *Public Opinion Quartely*, 61, 477-507.

Business Economics & New TeChnologies Laboratory

Appendix 1

Curriculum vitaes' Type Style – Synopses

Applicant: A **Curriculum Vitae** **First Name:** **Last Name:** **Ethnicity:** Greek **Marital Status:** Unmarried **Date of Birth:** .../.../1978 **Address:** Location **Telephone:** Mobile **Military Services:** Location, Carried Out in 1998 **Education:** Certificate of Greek high school in 1996, Location Basic Knowledge of English and P/C Driving License **Professional Experience:** From August 1998 to January 2000 Appointment/ Firm From March 2000 to March 2003 Appointment/ Firm From April 2003 to …200(6)7 Appointment/ Firm **Interests:** Sports and Travels Member volunteer in the Athenian Homosexual Community (01-05) **Personal Characteristics:** Productive and Associable	Applicant: B **<u>Curriculum Vitae</u>** <u>First Name</u> <u>Last Name</u> <u>Date of Birth</u> …/…/1978 <u>Ethnicity</u> Greek <u>Marital Status</u> Unmarried <u>Address</u> Location <u>Telephone</u> Mobile **<u>Experience</u>** <u>Appointment</u>/ <u>Firm</u> February1998- November1999 <u>Appointment</u>/ <u>Firm</u> December1999-July 2004 <u>Appointment</u>/ <u>Firm</u> August2004-…200(6)7 **<u>Education</u>** <u>Certificate of Greek high school</u> in 1996, Location <u>English</u> Basic Knowledge <u>P/C</u> Basic Knowledge **<u>Personal</u>** <u>Military Services</u> Carried Out in 1998 <u>Hobbies</u> Volunteer in the Olympus: Environmental Union from 1999-2003, Travels/Sports <u>Personality</u> Industrious, Efficient, Associable <u>Driving License</u>

**Business Economics
& New TeChnologies Laboratory**

Appendix 2 Table 2.1 Invitation to Interviews; Actual Observations & Probabilities

Occupations (Probabilities)	Job Openings	Both Applicants Invited for Interview	Total Invitations for the Straight Applicant	Total Invitations for the Gay Applicant
Office Jobs	455	46 (0.101)	186 (0.408)	47 (0.103)
Industries	346	40 (0.115)	129 (0.372)	42 (0.121)
Restaurant & Café Services	511	57 (0.111)	167 (0.326)	59 (0.115)
Shop Sales	402	87 (0.216)	205 (0.509)	91 (0.226)
Total	1714	230 (0.134)	687 (0.400)	239 (0.139)

Table 2.2 Invitation to Interviews; Actual Observations & Probabilities

Occupations (Probabilities)	Neither Applicant Invited for Interview	Discrimination Against the Straight Applicant	Discrimination Against the Gay Applicant
Office Jobs	268 (0.589)	1 (0.002)	140 (0.307)
Industries	215 (0.621)	2 (0.005)	89 (0.257)
Restaurant & Café Services	342 (0.669)	2 (0.003)	110 (0.215)
Shop Sales	193 (0.480)	4 (0.009)	118 (0.293)
Total	1018 (0.593)	9 (0.005)	457 (0.266)

Table 2.3 Monthly Wages Offers (€); Entire Data Set

Occupations (Observations)	Straight Mean Wage	Gay Mean Wage
Office Jobs	749.6 (101)	740.83 (24)
Industries	687.91 (72)	685 (18)
Restaurant & Café Services	649.41 (85)	643.33 (21)
Shop Sales	639.44 (108)	624.46 (47)
Total	681.69 (366)	663.36 (110)

Table 2.4 Monthly Wages Offers (€); Limited Sample

Occupations (Observations)	Straight Mean Wage	Gay Mean Wage
Office Jobs	747.5 (24)	740.83 (24)
Industries	693.33 (18)	685 (18)
Restaurant & Café Services	656.19 (21)	643.33 (21)
Shop Sales	636.59 (47)	624.46 (47)
Total	673.82 (110)	663.36 (110)

Business Economics & New TeChnologies Laboratory

Appendix 3 Table 3.1 Probit: Marginal Effects; Invitation to Interviews

Exogenous Variables: Occupations (Observations)	Sexual Orientation	Curriculum Vitaes' Sending Order	Curriculum Vitaes' Type Style
Office Jobs			
β_1	-0.303	0.004	-0.004
s.e.	(0.294)	(0.007)	(0.006)
p-values	0.000*	0.197	0.049**
Observations	-910-	-910-	-910-
Industries			
β_1	-0.250	0.007	0.037
s.e.	(0.257)	(0.012)	(0.056)
p-values	0.000*	0.249	0.108
Observations	-692-	-692-	-692-
Restaurant and Café Services			
β_1	-0.211	0.008	0.026
s.e.	(0.202)	(0.009)	(0.022)
p-values	0.000*	0.020**	0.124
Observations	-1022-	-1022-	-1022-
Shop Sales			
β_1	-0.290	0.001	0.038
s.e.	(0.151)	(0.008)	(0.023)
p-values	0.000*	0.843	0.098
Observations	-804-	-804-	-804-
Total			
β_1	-0.262	0.005	0.023
s.e.	(0.208)	(0.008)	(0.021)
p-values	0.000*	0.161	0.102
Observations	-3428-	-3428-	-3428-

Notes: The three variables are pooled simultaneously. Standard errors (in the parenthesis) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*); 5 %(**).

Table 3.2 OLS: Coefficient Estimations & Marginal Effects Limited Sample

Exogenous Variables: Occupations (Observations)	Panel A Sexual Orientation		Panel B Sexual Orientation		Firms' Callbacks Order	
Office Jobs						
β_2	-6.666	me -0.008	-6.444	me -0.008	-0.888	me -0.001
s.e.	(12.777)		(10.657)		(13.179)	
p-values	0.611		0.556		0.947	
Observations	-48-		-48-		-48-	
Industries						
β_2	-8.333	me -0.011	-8.896	me -0.012	2.532	me 0.003
s.e.	(26.095)		(26.083)		(19.462)	
p-values	0.755		0.739		0.898	
Observations	-36-		-36-		-36-	
Restaurant and Café Services						
β_2	-12.857	me -0.019	-13.333	me -0.020	3.333	me 0.005
s.e.	(15.465)		(16.199)		(26.718)	
p-values	0.422		0.427		0.903	
Observations	-42-		-42-		-42-	
Shop Sales						
β_2	-12.127	me -0.019	-12.941	me -0.020	2.941	me 0.004
s.e.	(12.678)		(15.205)		(10.020)	
p-values	0.355		0.409		0.773	
Observations	-94-		-94-		-94-	
Total						
β_2	-10.454	me -0.015	-10.623	me -0.015	0.931	me 0.001
s.e.	(11.575)		(11.983)		(6.645)	
p-values	0.375		0.384		0.890	
Observations	-220-		-220-		-220-	

Notes: Standard errors (in the parenthesis) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*); 5 %(**).

Appendix 4 Table 4.1 Coefficient Estimations & Marginal Effects; Independent Variable: Persons' Sex Responsible for Applicants' Selection   Limited Sample

Occupations	Office Jobs	Industries	Restaurant and Café Services	Shop Sales	Total
Coefficient					
Panel A : male					
$\beta_{Spm}{}^{l}$	-10.000 me -0.013	-10.625 me -0.015	-14.210 me -0.021	-14.054 me -0.003	-13.973 me -0.021
s.e.	(12.927)	(23.597)	(17.385)	(13.754)	(13.983)
p-values	0.455	0.661	0.430	0.326	0.328
Observations	-32-	-32-	-38-	-74-	-176-
Panel B: female					
$\beta_{Spf}{}^{l}$	0.000 me 0.000	0.000 me 0.000	-15.000 me -0.024	-5.000 me -0.007	-2.272 me -0.003
s.e.	(28.108)	(1.224)	(125.386)	(10.250)	(13.584)
p-values	1.000	1.000	0.916	0.646	0.870
Observations	-16-	-4-	-4-	-20-	-44-

Notes: In Panel A, the dependent variable is males' wage offers. In Panel B, the dependent variable is females' wage offers. Sex impact is measured by the coefficients $\beta_{Spm}{}^{l}$ and $\beta_{Spf}{}^{l}$. Standard errors (in the parenthesis) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*); 5 %(**).

UNIVERSITY OF CRETE

Business Economics & New TeChnologies Laboratory